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Postcolonial republicanism and the revival of a paradigm 
Manjeet Ramgotra, SOAS University of London 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why did republicanism enjoy renewed interest in the sixties and seventies and 
a ‘revival’ in the history of Western political thought?1  Over the twentieth-century 
there was a proliferation of independent states, many of which threw off the yoke of 
colonial imperialism and conceptualized themselves as independent sovereign 
republics.  Yet the main thrust of the study of republicanism has focused on how the 
classical Greek and Roman republican paradigm centered on virtue, citizenship and 
self-government developed in the history of Western political theory to culminate in 
the foundings of the American and French republics.  As such the historical 
excavation and revival of the republican paradigm elides twentieth-century 
postcolonial republican foundings.  I am curious to know why.  Is this a conceptual 
silence or oversight?  Or is something else going on?  For instance, do the 
postcolonial creations of the Indian republic, say, break with the virtue-based 
reiteration of the Aristotelian and neo-roman concepts to such an extent that they 
ought to be considered apart?  Or do these twentieth-century foundings transform the 
tradition into something new?2  
There are several reasons as to why the recent study of republicanism has 
focused on the history of Western political thought.  First, the mainstream view 
depicts republicanism as a discursive tradition centered on virtue that was challenged 
and eclipsed by western liberal discourses constructed around the idea of rights.3  
Second, examination of western republicanism reflects the intrinsic interest of the 
historian of political thought as well as her formation.  Third, many anti-colonial 
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movements and creations of nation-states tend to be read in terms of nationalism and 
Marxism.  In this context, the application of the term ‘republic’ became a ubiquitous, 
generic and empty signifier; and postcolonial republics were seen to lack the moral 
character and depth of western republics.  Finally, there was a reclaiming of the 
republican tradition and practice as western.   
Recent republican historiography stops short at the nineteenth-century when 
liberalism purportedly eclipsed republicanism.  As such, this writing of history elides 
significant revolutions and republican foundings that occurred in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, including the radical Haitian Revolution (1801) that emancipated 
slaves and made them citizens4 and the non-violent Indian revolution and republican 
founding (1947).  This exclusion of postcolonial republican foundings from the 
historiography of republicanism perpetuates the division between the West and non-
West.5   
Although the post-apartheid republic of South Africa (1994) was founded after 
this republican revival in the history of political thought, the anti-apartheid movement 
that led to it coincided with this revival.  The South African case, then, also presents 
an instance of how the decolonizing republic is elided in scholarly and theoretical 
discussions of republicanism.  Lawrence Hamilton’s in-depth theoretical and 
prescriptive study of the South African republic and how it might be reformed to 
create real effective freedom, or freedom as power as he terms it, demonstrates the 
limits and short-comings of mainstream republican theory in the realization of these 
goals.6  To Hamilton, if we want to actualize real and effective freedom associated 
with living in a state in which citizens have the power to determine who governs and 
how they govern then we must start decolonizing the republic and create institutions 
that not only are responsive to the vital needs of citizens, to the problems of racial and 
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sexual discrimination but also that give effective voice to citizens formally and 
institutionally.  There is much merit in his work and argument and I see this as 
following in a long trajectory of the transformation and amelioration of republican 
ideals through the founding of postcolonial republics in the last century that initially 
conceptualized themselves as egalitarian, inclusive of gender, race and class in the 
citizen body and as non-aggressive and equal states in a new global order.  I will 
develop these ideas in greater detail below, but first I would like to address the 
question that animates this research.  Why did the republican revival of the mid-
twentieth-century elide the republican foundings that followed decolonization? 
Key republican theorists such as Hannah Arendt, J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin 
Skinner focus on European and Atlantic articulations of republicanism.  Arendt 
considers revolutions apart from the American and French as illegitimate because 
they did not found proper republics and institutions in which active citizens 
deliberated with others, controlled the flow of events and history and imposed their 
agency on politics.7  Rather they were republics in name, not substance.  Pocock 
differentiates republicanism from liberalism in terms of discourse.  It follows from 
this line of reasoning that since the language of liberalism superseded that of 
republicanism, republics founded in the processes of decolonization were imbibed in 
languages of rights as opposed to virtue.  Yet anti-colonial language and state 
foundings promoted self-government and the sacrifice of private interests for the 
public good and the creation of new, participatory and free republics.  
In effect, two discursive narratives are recounted: that of western republics 
steeped in classical Graeco-Roman tradition and that of postcolonial republics steeped 
in local histories and the language of anti-colonial resistance.  Both narratives are 
about a republican paradigm that asserts human agency, moral personality and virtue 
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to rule over inchoate circumstance and change understood in terms of history, politics 
and fortune.  One is told from the perspective of a western history that imposes its 
agency, civilization and virtue both within republics as well as over colonies 
understood as undeveloped or corrupt societies.  The other is told from the 
perspective of the colonized who reclaim their virtue and agency to overcome their 
subjugation and to shake off the yoke of imperialism.  Mainstream Anglo-American 
theorists and historians of republicanism do not read these narratives on the same 
plane or as part of the same historiography perhaps because one narrates a story of 
colonial empire and the other seeks to reclaim its history against the colonial power 
and as an equal independent republic.  One promotes an expansive republic that seeks 
to dominate and the other an emancipatory republic that aims to overthrow foreign 
domination.  As such these two histories are in tension with one another. 
Both western and postcolonial conceptions of republicanism invoke a virtue 
versus fortune paradigm in the effort to obtain power and to effect change.  These 
histories are told from two different perspectives:  that of the colonizer and of the 
colonized.  Arendt’s agent/history and Pocock’s virtue/fortune paradigms that 
underpin republicanism are about knowing when to seize power (revolution) and how 
to use it in order to dominate over fortune, unruly circumstance and to rule 
accordingly (freedom).  Pocock draws this paradigm out of Machiavelli who, at the 
beginning of the sixteenth-century, advocated an expansive republic.  At this moment, 
European powers were beginning to establish colonial empires abroad and to 
Machiavelli the virtue/fortune paradigm referred both to the founding of states and the 
construction of expansive republics.  It is ironic that Pocock reiterates this paradigm 
that stood at the end of this cycle as European colonial empires were dismantled and 
twentieth-century republics forged through the processes of decolonization repudiated 
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European imperialism.  To this extent these two historiographies are intimately 
related yet opposed and this is no doubt why decolonized republics are not included in 
the republican revival of the late twentieth-century. 
 
THE REPUBLICAN PARADIGM:  VIRTUE/FORTUNE 
In The Machiavellian Moment:  Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, Pocock recounts a story of the classical, Florentine and Atlantic 
republican tradition in terms of a linguistic paradigm of virtue that is reasserted at 
moments of crisis, when the republic’s existence is threatened.  Pocock’s work is 
about time and he presents an historicist understanding of republicanism.  He qualifies 
these reiterative moments as Machiavellian to refer both to Machiavelli’s use of the 
virtù-fortuna paradigmatic struggle and the subversive and revolutionary ways of 
thinking that Machiavelli symbolizes.8   
Pocock contends that in moments of crisis and change, the classical republic 
confronts its limits.  To survive, it reasserts the universal value of virtue that posits all 
citizens contribute to ruling and being ruled according to the good of all, that is to say 
the predominant political ideology that holds sway over society.  In this manner, 
citizens assert their moral personality.  In addition, the exercise of virtue refers to the 
mastery and domination of the circumstances that provoke crisis depicted in terms of 
corruption, fortune or commerce.  These symbolize self-interest, change and the 
confrontation or engagement with the external world, respectively.  Each destabilizes 
the citizen’s virtue and commitment to the public good including the sacrifice of one’s 
private interests.  To Pocock, when a republic is confronted by one or a combination 
of these elements, the only way for it to maintain itself is to reassert its virtue, its 
universality as a community in which all are engaged in the pursuit of the universal 
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good of the whole.  This is captured in the language of virtue confronting fortune.9  
As a body in which all citizens share in ruling, the republic opposes the tyrannical 
rule of an oppressive prince or a foreign imperialist.  Pocock locates the moment that 
the classical republic reasserts its universal values of moral personality (virtue) over 
change and the flow of events (fortune and time) in Machiavelli’s thought.  
Machiavelli stood at a moment of great change in conceptualizations of both the 
world and time.  He wrote the Prince around 1513 shortly after Columbus sailed to 
the West Indies and da Gama sailed around the horn of Africa. 
In the Prince, Machiavelli’s deployment of the virtù/fortuna paradigm refers 
to both sexual and political domination in its male-female metaphor.10  The prince is 
portrayed to be manly and virile and to use his strategic political and military skills to 
dominate over the female goddess, fortuna who represents the uncontrollable, 
irrational, contingent and unknown, essentially the movement of time and change.  
The metaphor is taken to refer to the prince’s ability to create and maintain a state 
against the vagaries of fortune that could destabilize and overthrow his power.  
Pocock considers the metaphor in terms of the republic and takes this to be the 
reiteration of Aristotle’s classical republican paradigm in which citizens cultivate 
virtue to maintain the good; in the Machiavellian context citizens trained in military 
virtue defend and maintain the republic and its values.  In The Discourses, 
Machiavelli promotes an expansive republic based on the Roman republic that was 
highly successful in achieving glory and empire.  Were we to read Machiavelli’s ideas 
in the context of the moment when he wrote, when the world was transformed as 
Europe came into contact with the new world and as Spain and Portugal began 
empire-building abroad,11 the virtù-fortuna paradigm comes across in another light.  It 
no longer simply reflects the historicist reiteration of the benevolent Aristotelian 
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paradigm in crisis.  But rather the paradigm could be read as a strategy to control 
unknown, contingent forces and the necessity to dominate over change.  Moreover, in 
Machiavelli’s day, much of Italy was subject to foreign domination.  In The Prince, 
Machiavelli calls for a leader to liberate Italy from its desperate, scattered, beaten, 
lacerated and despoiled position to redeem its greatness; whereas, in The Discourses, 
he argues that virtue, rather than fortune led to Rome’s grandeur and allowed Rome to 
expand and create an empire.12  Although virtue serves to liberate, it is also man’s 
skill to acquire power, to achieve glory and to dominate and rule over matter, 
including land, people, nature and unexpected circumstance. 
Ashis Nandy’s work on the psychology of colonialism presents a striking 
parallel between the virtue/fortune metaphor and the colonizer/colonized relation of 
power and subjugation that he sees as “rooted in earlier forms of social 
consciousness”.13  The political domination of colonizer over colonized is similar to 
sexual domination and echoes the virtù/fortuna male-female metaphor in which the 
masculine virtue dominates over the feminine fortune by rendering her weak and 
ineffective.  To Nandy, this homology 
was not an accidental by-product of colonial history.  It had its 
correlates in other situations of oppression…..  The homology … 
beautifully legitimized Europe’s post-medieval models of dominance, 
exploitation and cruelty as natural and valid.  Colonialism, too, was 
congruent with the existing Western sexual stereotypes and the 
philosophy of life which they represented.  It produced a cultural 
consensus in which the political and socio-economic dominance 
symbolized the dominance of men and masculinity over women and 
femininity.14 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Penn State University Press in The Good Society Vol.26 
No.1, 34-54. Published version available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/goodsociety.26.1.0034  
Accepted version available from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26156/  
 
8 
 
Nandy captures the notion that an external power often portrays the colonized mass as 
an uncontrollable force that needs to be weakened and emasculated to be harnessed.  
This reflects Machiavelli’s maxim that empires are acquired through virtue, not 
chance and his view that the dominated are lacerated, beaten and despoiled.  This 
paradigm of power in which the skilled and powerful ruler emasculates and dominates 
over the ruled is played out in relations of gender, slavery, colonialism, social class 
and race.  For instance, South African apartheid required this sort of social imaginary 
to maintain the rule of a minority over a majority.15  This framework of dominatory 
relations within the republic applies as well to the domination of territories and 
peoples outside of the republic.  To Machiavelli, the republic is a political form that 
both controls circumstance and internal politics and exerts domination externally over 
colonies.   At the same time, this relation can be reversed.  The active citizen can 
acquire the mantle of power against political domination; yet, once in a ruler, the 
citizen imposes power to control the forces of fortune and the external world.16   
Pocock’s use of Machiavelli’s virtue/fortune metaphor as the defining element 
of republicanism is revealing.  He juxtaposes situates two congruent moments.  The 
sixteenth-century moment, when expansion forces the European state to reform itself 
to dominate the external world; and the twentieth-century moment, when the 
colonized redefine themselves to become self-determining and to oppose imperialist 
domination.  In this later moment, European states had to reconceptualize themselves 
as they relinquished empire and confronted the limits of their existence.  The western 
republic’s assertion of the universality of virtue and moral personality reflects the 
desire to maintain a semblance of power as a political structure that cannot be 
emulated by former colonies.  Hence republicanism as a political ideology of the vita 
activa is reclaimed as western with a genealogy extending to ancient Greece.  
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Pocock’s Machiavellian virtù-fortuna paradigm parallels Arendt’s 
understanding of history as a moment of major change, when a new era begins as 
revolutionary forces overthrow old structures and forms of rule.  Arendt does not 
draw on the metaphor of male domination over women.  She uses the language of 
political actors and history and is concerned with creating a stable republic through 
which men could control events, politics, history and exercise their freedom.  To 
Arendt, the metaphor is expressed in terms of free agency and history during 
revolutionary moments when active agents throw off the yoke of domination, attempt 
to control the flow of events and master their destiny through the creation of a 
republic.  Without constitutional structures that would allow individuals to assert their 
agency and exercise their freedom, they would be swept away by the forces of history 
and lose their agency to direct politics.17   
To Nandy, the metaphor is expressed in terms of the colonizer dominating 
over the colonized.  Once the colonized reclaim their agency, they bring about 
revolution and exercise freedom.  In revolutionary and anti-colonial instances, the 
metaphor is subverted and reasserted.  To Arendt, this does not always happen.  Anti-
colonial revolutionary forces seek freedom but do not know how to institute freedom 
once is has been acquired.  These forces collapse into an inchoate mass of people 
controlled by history.  Often the people are in need and according to Arendt their 
necessity guides their actions to follow the flow of events and to lack the foresight to 
establish a new order.  They are vulnerable and liable to be subjugated once again by 
a tyrannical power.  Arendt considered twentieth-century revolutions disastrous since 
they failed to establish a new order.  They did not establish republics that stand 
outside the cycle of never-ending change, domination and subjection; rather they 
descended into terror, chaos and license.18  Yet postcolonial republics (such as India) 
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were able to resist domination, to reclaim their freedom and self-mastery.  The two 
histories of imperial domination and anti-colonial resistance are in tension and this 
may be why the story of the European republic does not go beyond the eighteenth-
century.  From the western perspective, these are distinct and incongruent histories.  
From the postcolonial viewpoint, these histories are intertwined and the founding of a 
republic asserts an equal sovereignty and status but challenges the political dominance 
of the West.   
 
WESTERN INTELLECTUAL CONTEXTS 
A key reason as to why republicanism had been neglected in Anglo-American 
understandings of the history of political thought is that American scholarship in the 
sixties was preoccupied by fierce debate between proponents of the liberal consensus 
and post-progressive materialist historians.  The former claimed that American 
constitutionalism was rooted in Lockean liberalism and that there was a consensus on 
the liberal ideology.19  The latter group of historians contested this consensus and 
defended leftist ideals.  The result was intellectual deadlock.  Nevertheless, leftist 
historians lost credibility due to the Cold War, McCarthyism and fear of communist 
revolution.  The language of republicanism emerged out of this deadlock and 
presented another way to conceptualize politics.20  American historians uncovered the 
republican roots of America’s constitutional founding.21  Bernard Bailyn 
reconstructed the debates of revolutionary pamphleteers who advocated balanced 
constitutional government, freedom, virtue and reason and Gordon Wood located the 
ideological origins of the American republic in the notion of virtue and the “sacrifice 
of individual interests to the greater good of the whole”.22  These republican 
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principles contrasted with the liberal individualism and commercialism of Locke as 
well as with post-progressive materialist discourse.23 
Nevertheless, Arendt revitalized a theory of republicanism that focused on the 
active participation of all citizens in shaping their political lives.  In her work on 
revolution of the early sixties, she asked why the creation of the American republic 
did not hold the same place as French revolution and republican founding in the 
contemporary political imagination.24  She argued that new republics which arose 
through often revolutionary processes of decolonization were not ‘true’ republics 
since they did not culminate in establishing freedom and a constitutional government.  
Rather than consider the foundings of these newly decolonized states as republican 
these were looked at through the lens of nationalism and political violence.  Arendt’s 
understanding of republicanism and its classical grounding argument greatly 
influenced Pocock.  Notably her argument that the imposition of human agency on the 
flow of history could result in freedom if this activity aimed at the common good is 
reiterated in his conceptualization of moral personality and virtue over fortune and 
change.  
As part of the Cambridge School of Historians, Pocock’s work resonated with 
Quentin Skinner.  Both were concerned with methodology and how to approach the 
study of ideas in history.  Pocock advocated an historicist approach and examined the 
rearticulation of paradigmatic ideas at critical moments.  Skinner provided the tools 
with which we could study ideas in their intellectual contexts, in the time and place 
they were written and within the particular debates they addressed and were 
couched.25  Both historians focused on language and speech acts.  They examined 
what languages were available, what words a thinker chose to articulate her/his 
thought and how these operated in discursive fields, linguistic paradigms, ideologies, 
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historical and intellectual contexts.26  Both criticized the ahistorical and philosophical 
approach of historians of political thought who read a ‘modern’ history of liberalism 
and rights discourse back into the history of Western political ideas.27  These 
methodologies provided historians the tools to revive the neglected republican 
paradigm.  Simultaneously, the postcolonial moment in which this republican 
paradigm was excavated abounded with republican rhetoric.  Calls to participate and 
take control of politics for the good of all, to contest the politics of the powers that be 
and to push boundaries to include more people in the political were in full swing, 
notably in the American Civil Rights and the South African Anti-Apartheid 
Movements.  Yet this political activism and civic spiritedness were not included in the 
reconstruction of republicanism.28 
Context, time, space, memory and silence are relevant to how we choose to 
construct and narrate our understandings of the world.  Even though a scholar’s 
intellectual interests may focus solely on a particular history or idea, the scholar ought 
to be aware of its articulations outside the parameters of her/his study especially if 
these are current.  For our positionality shapes how we view the world and equally the 
events of the world inform how we read and formulate ideas.29  
 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE LIVING REPUBLIC 
Sixties and seventies civil rights, anti-war, and anti-establishment movements 
were influenced by anti-colonial discourse and activism from abroad.  These 
movements brought democratic, cultural and social change across the West and 
shaped much of post-structural and post-modern thinking.30  According to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty, “[a]nticolonial discourse (Fanon, Gandhi et. al.) traveled back to the 
West at the same time as civil-liberties movements and anti-war demonstrations broke 
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out, alongside movements of indigenous peoples and immigrant groups for cultural 
sovereignty and recognition.”31  Moreover, within western universities, post-
structuralist and post-modernist debates questioned “the canonical texts that had 
represented the nation or the West”.32  These discussions occurred in tandem with the 
questioning of the centralization of Locke in the canon and the assertion that western 
thinkers may be read as republicans.  It is informative to read the republican vogue in 
these broader contexts, which, at some level, must have informed the revival of the 
republican paradigm.   
Moreover these movements gained momentum across borders in the US, 
England, Europe and South Africa with calls for racial and gender equality, an end to 
segregation and apartheid.  Debate about freedom of movement, political 
representation, identity, who governs and how, as well as how to effect political 
transformation informed this moment.  Hamilton’s work on representation and his 
critique of contemporary republican theorists who claim that the history of western 
political thought promotes a free state, the freedom from domination and the 
participation in a public spirit is important.  He demonstrates that these ideas 
conceived within classical western republican frameworks are inadequate to address 
the complex modern world in which we live where people are part of various groups 
and are not simply represented as being a part of a single consensual ‘common 
good’.33  Hamilton emphasizes that the goals of many anti-colonial struggles were not 
about “being ‘free from impediment’ or living in a free state”.  These struggles “had 
more concrete political, economic and social goals: being free to determine who rules 
and how they rule; to produce, exchange and consume wherever and whenever; to 
love, procreate, entertain oneself and others, bring up one’s children … and to do so 
in conditions free of poverty and racial and gender discrimination and domination.”  
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Standing on the shoulders of great political leaders (Nyerere, Fanon and Mandela), 
Hamilton remarks that achieving “political freedom alone does not secure these”.34  
The substance of the anti-colonial and freedom struggles went deeper than the simple 
republican call for political freedom.  Neither were these attempts to found new 
republics empty signifiers nor simply about the creation of a free state.  At stake were 
deeper questions about political rule, representation, social and economic goals, as 
noted above.   
Equally events across the world from processes of decolonization to the 
gathering of newly independent African and Asian states at the 1955 Bandung 
Conference may have impacted republican historiography.  The Bandung Conference 
sought to articulate a new voice in the new international order.  Twenty-nine newly 
found states participated in the conference.  They shared an “anti-imperial ethic” and 
aimed at sustaining “a sense of Asian-African affinity”.35  Many anti-colonial leaders 
were inspired by the American and French republican foundings.  The connection 
between the American Revolution and anti-colonial revolutions formed part of the 
postcolonial imagination and Sukarno commemorated the beginning of the American 
Revolution in his opening speech.36  New African and Asian states (excepting South 
Africa at this time) were not considered equals by their western counterparts.  They 
were seen as nation-states that distribute rights to a by and large passive citizenry who 
do not have the requisite level of education or autonomy to engage in ruling or to 
cultivate a meaningful sense of public-spiritedness. 
 
THE INDIAN REPUBLIC 
India presents an example of a recent republican founding at a crucial juncture 
in world history at the end of World War II.  During India’s long struggle for 
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independence, Jawaharlal Nehru looked to the American and French revolutions for 
inspiration.  He considered the creation of the Indian republic to be part of a history of 
great republican foundings extending from ancient Roman, to the Dutch, British, 
American and French to those of his day, the Spanish, Irish, Chinese, Turkish and 
Syrian.  Nehru sought not only to create a bridge between European and Indian 
history, but also to develop a wider world history.37  He envisioned India as a 
sovereign democratic republic that would have an equal place in the world as other 
sovereign republics.38  He believed that India and China would take their rightful 
places as major civilizational powers within the world.  Whilst in prison, Nehru 
composed many works in which he conceptualized the creation of a stable 
democratic, socialist/egalitarian and republican state.   
Nehru drew on a vast array of ideas, experience and practices from all corners 
of the globe in the development of his vision of a self-governing state.  In shaping his 
political vision both Enlightenment ideals and Indian philosophy played a decisive 
role.  He drew on Enlightenment intellectual history and ideas that shaped the ideals 
of Western republican self-determination as well as the ideals of the Indian struggle 
for self-rule (swaraj) based on principles of truth (satyagraha) and effected through 
non-violent protest (ahimsa) as well as the sacrifice of private interests for the end of 
independence.39  Nehru transformed the western republican ideal based on the notion 
of res publica, the public thing to reflect a more contemporary egalitarian, inclusive 
and just society.  The Indian struggle combined the languages of res publica and 
swaraj.  The first is concerned mainly with the mixed constitution, and, the second, 
with rule of both the self and the political association.  In my view, the combination 
of these two languages captures, better than pre-nineteenth western republican theory 
and experience, the idea that republicanism means the self-rule of all adult individuals 
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incorporated as equal citizens.  We find this principle in Arendt, Pocock and mainly 
Skinner, who clearly associates republicanism with self-rule:  that individuals can be 
free only in an egalitarian and participatory self-governing republic.  This ideal was 
reconceptualized in nineteenth and twentieth-century movements for independence 
and universal egalitarian suffrage.  The republican mixed constitution incorporated 
citizens into the public realm on a hierarchical basis, according to class; whereas the 
Indian republic promoted the ideal of self-rule and incorporated adult men and 
women on an equal basis.  These languages and experiences combined to produce our 
contemporary understanding of republicanism.  
In Glimpses of World History, Nehru cautiously applauds the democratic gains 
acquired through American and French revolutions and underlines that these ideals 
have not been fully obtained:  
But meanwhile the new ideas of democracy were spreading, and the 
American and French Revolutions gave them tremendous popularity 
and advertisement.  The fine-sounding words and phrases of the 
American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of 
Rights stirred people to the depths.  To the millions who were 
oppressed and exploited they brought a thrill and a message of 
deliverance.  Both the declarations spoke of liberty and equality and of 
the right to happiness….  The proud declaration of these precious 
rights did not result in the people obtaining them.  Even now, a century 
and a half after these declarations, few can be said to enjoy them.  But 
even the declaration of these principles was extraordinary and life-
giving.40 
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Nehru refers to the exclusion of people of colour, women and the poor in the creation 
of these republics.  In his view, much work remains to achieve freedom and equality.  
He believes that India could deliver these goals. 
Nehru’s republicanism consisted in four core elements.  First, he advocated a 
republic that would achieve full military, economic and political independence from 
imperial domination.  He drew upon the American experience of founding a free and 
independent republic that established a political constitution and self-government.  
Nehru depicted this as political republicanism.  Second, Nehru opposed monarchy and 
argued that India would have to co-opt each of its independent princely states by 
giving the peoples of these states the choice in how they wanted to be ruled.  In the 
end, bringing these states into the Indian republic required much negotiation and 
bloodshed, but for the most part he was successful in integrating these independent 
principalities.  He was influenced by the French revolution that terminated 
monarchical rule and social hierarchy.  He called this social republicanism that 
entailed the creation of new social relations between individuals mediated by laws 
rather than relations of dependence and hierarchy.  This could be achieved through 
the creation of a constitutional sovereign state by contract through a Constituent 
Assembly.  Third, Nehru called for a popularly sanctioned Constituent Assembly, 
equal citizenship and universal adult suffrage.  He aimed at unity against 
communalism and promoted social and gender equality.  Fourth, he argued that in a 
postcolonial world that had shed imperial domination, equal republics ought to be 
non-aggressive and non-expansive.  Nehru advanced cooperative relations amongst 
states and the creation of an international community and institutions to further the 
ends of peace and security.   Finally, leaders of the Indian revolution adopted non-
violence as the means to oust the British Raj.  Although this was not the most efficient 
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means to achieve change, it mobilized the masses and created a new identity based on 
a new understanding of politics and India.41 
As India was poised to create its own constitution according to the ‘Aims and 
Objectives Resolution’ passed by the Constituent Assembly in January 1947, Nehru 
declared: 
We claim in this Resolution to frame a free and democratic Indian 
Republic.  A question may be asked what relation will that Republic 
bear to other countries of the world? …  Today any man who can think 
a little will come to the conclusion that the only way to remove doubts 
and dangers from the world, is to unite all the nations and ask them to 
work together and help each other.42 
India is an important case for it hailed the end of the British Empire.  India stood as a 
model for other states that sought independence from colonial imperialism.  India 
demonstrates that as part of a wider history of republican foundings across the world, 
anti-colonial revolutions and struggles for emancipation and equality were not bereft 
of an understanding of political institutions and structures.  
The Indian republican founding was not perfect and there were disastrous 
consequences, notably partition of Pakistan from India, communalism and persistent 
gender and social inequality, especially with regard to Dalits.  Nevertheless India 
continues to function as the world’s largest constitutional democratic republic.   
India’s republican moment offers a rich array of ideas that may have informed 
silently the recent republican revival.  The values of self-sacrifice, of putting the 
public good before private interests were central to the non-violent revolution that 
required mass participation.  During this long-winded revolution men and women of 
all religious, social and economic backgrounds mobilized and participated in politics 
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through demonstrations, political parties, boycotts and passive resistance.  Resistance 
invoked civic virtue, the cultivation of a public spirit and the willingness to participate 
in the public sphere  
 
POSTCOLONIAL REPUBLICS 
The postcolonial republic emerges from processes of decolonization.  I refer 
mainly to the Indian republic, but will also discuss Hamilton’s contributions to this 
conception.  The postcolonial republic is conceived in a world order of equal 
sovereign states that aim at peace and security.  Postcolonial republics advocate social 
and gender equality, multiculturalism, and, in the case of India, a secularity that 
requires the republic to take principled distance from and coexist with all religions.43  
Postcolonial republics repudiate tyranny, the imperialism of a foreign dominator and 
their own imperial domination over foreign states; they seek cooperation.  They 
advocate a particular end: the creation of a self-governing republic constructed on the 
basis of a constitution sanctioned by the fictitious but unanimous people and enacted 
through elections.  Founded on anti-colonial resistance these republics reiterate the 
ideal of political activism and participation in movements to secure freedom and 
greater equality through processes of contestation and through institutions that give 
effective voice to the people’s needs, especially those at the lower end of society.44  
In his study of representation in the postcolonial South African republic, 
Hamilton presents a normative conception of a postcolonial republic that would 
further these ends through creation institution and through a robust conception of the 
political and economic representation of citizens.  His critical approach produces not 
only sharp arguments to demonstrate that liberal and republican notions of negative 
freedom and non-domination as “the avoidance of alien interference or control” are 
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“politically unhelpful”.  For “they rest on the unrealistic assumption that politics can 
somehow proceed without representation and power relations.”  Rather Hamilton 
promotes a robust notion of freedom as power where an individual’s “freedom 
depends upon the power to:  “overcome existing obstacles”; “determine who governs 
my political association”; “resist the disciplining power of my community and state”; 
and “determine my social and economic environment via meaningful control over my 
representatives”.45  
Although he focuses on South Africa, his criticisms and prescriptions could be 
applied to republics across space and time.  His critique of and debt a wide range of 
political thinkers is deep and comprehensive.  Hamilton takes seriously the 
relationship between freedom and power.  Of concern to this study are his criticisms 
of mainstream republicanism as deriving roots from antiquity and of promoting 
freedom as non-domination.  To Hamilton their theories are ill-suited to modern 
times, do not address real needs and do not go far enough to counter and transform the 
voices of elite representatives.  It is not sufficient to argue, as many republicans do 
that “to live in a free state is to live in a situation of non-domination”.46  Rather this 
reduces freedom to the form of one’s state (a regime type) and does not make 
adequate provision for guaranteeing the freedom of ordinary people from the 
domination of elite representatives.   
Although Philip Pettit advocates contestatory mechanisms,47 Hamilton argues 
that these neither go far enough nor do they reconsider the relationship between 
political and economic representatives such that these rulers may be scrutinized and 
controlled to ensure that their policies secure the “enjoyments of a voluntarily chosen 
political life”.48  Hamilton claims that real modern and effective freedom depends on 
representation, on the power of formal and informal representatives, and on the 
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citizen’s “power to counter … ‘states of domination’ via effective political 
participation and meaningful control over political representatives”.49  He outlines 
four dimensions over which citizens ought to be able to exercise and realize freedom 
as power:  empowerment, representation, resistance and control.50  Freedom he claims 
is “a combination of my ability to determine what I will do and my power to do it, … 
to bring it about.”51   
He further advocates the creation of:  district assemblies in which citizens 
would be able to debate and formulate policies according to real needs and against 
real issues of discrimination that would in turn be presented via a consiliar system to 
political representatives and eventually formalized; a tribune of the plebs for members 
of dominated groups and classes in society to formulate and veto legislation.52  These 
formal and institutional mechanisms of power are intended to create real freedom and 
to give voice to various groups in society and in particular to those who have the least 
economic power.  These innovations are inspired by Machiavelli’s reading of Roman 
tribunal and popular politics as well as John McCormick’s proposal to reinstate a 
contemporary form of the people’s tribunes.53  Hamilton’s institutional 
recommendations work from the grassroots up and empower people, especially those 
who are marginalized through structural arrangements, or by class, race and gender. 
 He further considers that contemporary circumstances are highly complex and 
that individuals do not conceptualize themselves as part of people with a common 
moral vision but rather they are parts of a “series of overlapping groups” to which 
they are connected through various aspects of their being and identity.  Their 
participation and contribution to political society therefore differs in contemporary 
times from the more ancient cohesive city-states characterized by unity in the 
acquiescence of the common good.  Hamilton contends that “Arendt, Pettit and other 
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republicans romanticize” ancient history, notions of the good, “community solidarity, 
civic virtue and political action”.  Moreover, these are “unrealistic for citizens living 
complex modern lives with significant degrees of everyday independence from the 
state and other citizens.”54  In effect, he promotes a new understanding of freedom as 
power through which citizens are not only enabled to participate across a variety of 
institutions but also in which citizens must have control over who rules and how they 
rule.  In this regard, freedom is power is understood as a sense of positive control over 
the political, economic and environmental policies.  Hamilton’s prescriptive norms 
serve to decolonize institutional power of the post-apartheid South African republic 
and to decolonize the republican free state tied to notions of a single common good 
and freedom from domination.  In effect, Hamilton redesigns republican theory to 
promote a postcolonial republic that takes seriously freedom, the needs of citizens and 
their capacity to control political and economic policy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The reappearance of republicanism in the latter half of the twentieth-century 
was not due simply to the intellectual revival of a neglected history, language and 
narrative.  Rather republics were cropping up in the world recasting and reimagining 
the language and structures of politics.  Many of these new republics were not merely 
nationalist or communist; they were constitutionally established democratic republics 
that saw themselves as following in a long line of modern republican foundings.  To 
suppose that republican discourse had lapsed from the political imaginary misses the 
redeployment of this language and vocabulary in anti-colonial movements.  The 
republican tradition, with roots in the ancient world, continued to evolve through 
postcolonial foundings in nineteenth and twentieth-centuries.  These republics drew 
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on both Enlightenment and indigenous ideas and considered themselves part of a 
wider trajectory of the creation of modern states in a new world order of equal 
sovereign republics that repudiated the hierarchies of imperialism.  The virtue versus 
fortune paradigm shifted as women, the colonized and subjugated reclaimed their 
place in the political realm and reasserted their agency against dominatory rulers in 
the creation and founding of modern postcolonial republics. 
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